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Congress created the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in 1982 to bring greater uniformity to the country's
patent laws.' Drawing on this purpose, the Federal Circuit has
expanded this call for uniformity by also emphasizing the need for
predictability and certainty in the law. The court thus has articulated
fairly formalistic approaches to a number of issues. The use of
bright-line rules, however, is often at the cost of fairness. In the area
of property law, Professor Carol Rose highlighted this tension, and
noted the historical, pendulum-like shifts between clear, hard-edged,
"crystal" rules and uncertain "muddy" rules that afford greater
fairness.2 Professor Chisum identified this same tension in patent law
in his important piece, published in this journal in 1998, coining the
phrase "the Fair Protection-Certainty Conundrum."
3
The Federal Circuit increasingly has articulated rules of law to
promote certainty, at the expense of fairness. The root of this bias
likely derives from the court's Congressional mandate to promote
uniformity and certainty in patent law.4 This rules-based approach,
however, is not without critics. Professor Jay Thomas recently
detailed the evolution of this shift to formal, simplistic rules, noting
t Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. The author would like to
thank the Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law Journal for allowing me to
participate in this celebration of its 2 0 1h Anniversary, a truly outstanding accomplishment.
I. S. REP. No. 97-275, at 7 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 12.
2. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577-
79(1988).
3. Donald S. Chisum, The Scope of Protection for Patents After the Supreme Court's
Warner-Jenkinson Decision: The Fair Protection-Certainty Conundrum, 14 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 1 (1998).
4. See. e.g., Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) ("We apply Federal Circuit law to patent issues in order to serve one of the principal
purposes for the creation of this court: to promote uniformity in the law with regard to subject
matter within our exclusive appellate jurisdiction").
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that this approach may in fact impair innovation, not facilitate it.5
Professor Arti Rai also has expressed the view that such formalism
impairs innovation policy.6 This Essay posits, however, that not all of
the blame should fall on the Federal Circuit's shoulders. The
Supreme Court has expressly encouraged this approach in its recent
patent jurisprudence. This Essay will first identify the various ways
in which the Federal Circuit has opted for the "certainty" side of the
Fair Protection-Certainty Conundrum. Next, the Essay surveys recent
Supreme Court cases which show that the Supreme Court has enabled
this shift, making the Court complicit in the Federal Circuit's
formalism agenda.
II. FORMALISM AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
The tendency towards crystal rules at the Federal Circuit
transcends any particular issues in patent law. For example, in the
context of the on-sale bar to patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b),
the court has required that, to be "on-sale," the invention must have
been subject to a formal commercial offer to sell, as defined by
general principles of contract law.7  Similarly, the court requires a
formal commercial offer for infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)'s
"offer to sell" form of infringement.8 The court reasoned under both
of these scenarios that the requirement of a formal commercial offer
would facilitate greater certainty in the respective law. 9
The Federal Circuit has articulated formalistic rules in the
context of the written description requirement for patents on genes.
The court generally requires the disclosure of the entire genetic
sequence,' 0 although recently the court appears to have liberalized this
5. John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 774-75
(2003).
6. See generally Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional
Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003).
7. Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For
criticism of this standard, see Timothy R. Holbrook, Liability for the "Threat of a Sale":
Assessing Patent Infringement for Offering to Sell an Invention and Implications for the On-Sale
Patentability Bar and Other Forms of Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 780-84
(2003) [hereinafter Holbrook, Threat of a Sale].
8. Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1254-55 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see
generally Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 7.
9. Group One, 254 F.3d at 1047 (noting court's interest in bringing "greater certainty"
to the on-sale bar of the law by requiring formal commercial offers); Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1254-55
(relying on the on-sale bar standard to define § 271(a)'s "offer to sell").
10. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir.
1997); see generally Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description
Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615 (1998).
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harsh standard by allowing some functional description, so long as the
structure that performs that function is known in the art field." The
court has also turned its attention to obviousness. 12  Whereas the
Supreme Court's test for obviousness identified four relevant
factors,13 the Federal Circuit has elevated a fifth factor as a bright-line
requirement-the need for some teaching or motivation to combine
prior art references to yield the claimed invention.
4
Two key areas, however, most dramatically highlight the Federal
Circuit's formalistic agenda--claim construction and the doctrine of
equivalents. One of the most significant steps the Federal Circuit
took towards formalism was removing the jury from the most
important step in a patent infringement suit-the construction of the
claim language. In Markman v. Westview Instruments, the court
concluded that claim construction is a pure matter of law to be
decided by the judge and, consequently, reviewed on appeal de
novo.' 5 The clear motivating factor behind this step was to eliminate,
or at least minimize, the role of juries in patent cases, with the hope
that greater certainty and predictability would result.'
6
The doctrine of equivalents, however, has remained the court's
favorite avenue for impressing its formalistic agenda. The Federal
Circuit entered the fray surrounding the doctrine of equivalents in
Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.' The court held that the
doctrine of equivalents required an "element-by-element
comparison."' 8  The court reiterated the traditional tripartite,
11. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("[T]he
written description requirement would be met for all of the claims of the '659 patent if the
functional characteristic of preferential binding to N. gonorrhoeae over N. meningitidis were
coupled with a disclosed correlation between that function and a structure that is sufficiently
known or disclosed").
12. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000) (precludes patents on inventions that are "obvious" in
light of the prior art). In other words, patents will not be granted on trivial innovations.
13. Specifically, the scope and content of the prior art, the differences between the
relevant claim and the prior art, the level of ordinary skill in the art, and secondary indicia of
non-obviousness, such as commercial success, long felt but unsolved need, and the failure of
others. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
14. See, e.g.. Catalina Lighting, Inc. v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 295 F.3d 1277, 1288 (Fed. Cir.
2002); see also Thomas, supra note 5, at 773.
15. 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
16. See Craig Allen Nard, Process Consideration in the Age of Markman and Mantras,
U. ILL. L. REV. 355, 359-61 (2001).
17. 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc).
18. Id. at 935.
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"function-way-result,"' 9 but went on to note that, because each claim
element is essential, "the plaintiff must show the presence of every
element or its substantial equivalent in the accused device., 20  The
court thus first articulated the All-Elements Rule in applying the
doctrine of equivalents, a formalistic rule.
The specter of uncertainty continued to surround the doctrine of
equivalents, however. The court subsequently revisited the issue en
banc in Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Company.
21
In what was arguably a victory for the anti-formalists, the court
concluded, in a splintered decision, that infringement under the
doctrine is a question of fact for the jury, subject to deference on
appeal.22 The court also decided that equivalency was available in all
cases, and the triple identity test was not the exclusive standard for
assessing equivalency.23 Instead, the key inquiry for equivalency was
whether the accused device was insubstantially different from the
claimed invention.24 The triple identity helps inform this inquiry, but
it is not the sole test available.25
After Hilton-Davis, the courts' attention turned away from the
substance of the doctrine of equivalents itself and looked to
formalizing the legal limitations on the doctrine. For example, the
Federal Circuit recently held en banc that an equivalent that is
disclosed in the patent specification, but not claimed, falls into the
public domain, precluding coverage under the doctrine of
equivalents. 26 The court has used a similar specification disclaimer
19. Id. at 934. The Supreme Court articulated this test in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v.
Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) ("[A] patentee may invoke this doctrine to
proceed against the producer of a device 'if it performs substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to obtain the same result").
20. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d. at 935. For the argument that the Supreme Court altered the
Pennwalt test, see infra note 38.
21. 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). Professor Chisum identified two schools at
the Federal Circuit regarding the doctrine of equivalents that lead to the court taking Hilton
Davis en bane. The first school viewed the doctrine as available in every case, and not an
exception; the test for equivalency was the tripartite "function-way-result" test, and the ultimate
determination of infringement by equivalents was a fact question for the jury. Chisum, supra
note 3, at 14-15. The second school viewed the doctrine as available only in exceptional cases,
that the triple identity test was not the exclusive test, and that a judge must determine if an
equitable threshold had been crossed in order to apply the doctrine. Id. The ultimate outcome in
Hilton Davis was a mixture of these schools.




26. Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Service Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054-55 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (en banc).
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principle to preclude the application of the doctrine of equivalents
where the patentee, in the specification as opposed to the prosecution
history, surrenders relevant subject matter by explicitly disclaiming
coverage of a given embodiment. 27
The most recent-and audacious-shift to crystal rules occurred
in the Federal Circuit's en banc decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., which addressed the appropriate scope
of prosecution history estoppel.28 There, the court concluded that any
amendment to a claim precludes all equivalents as to that added claim
limitation. The court essentially eviscerated the protection afforded
by the doctrine of equivalents-which is intended to provide a level
of fairness to the patentee-if the inventor made an amendment to a
claim, a rather routine event during prosecution of a patent
application. As such, the Federal Circuit's approach dramatically
lessened, if not eliminated, the availability of the doctrine of
equivalents to patent holders.
III. THE SUPREME COURT-FACILITATING FORMALITY
The Federal Circuit has promoted an agenda favoring the
creation of bright-line legal rules which arguably aggrandize power at
the appellate level and which create unfairness to various parties for
the sake of certainty in the law. The court, however, is not the court
of last resort for patent cases; its decisions are still subject to
discretionary review by the Supreme Court. In the view of Professor
Mark Janis, however, this review effectively is non-existent.29 In his
view, the court in essence has abdicated its role in substantive patent
27. See, e.g., SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d
1337, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int'l, Inc., 212 F.3d 1377,
1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2000). This principle appears to be an estoppel of sorts, where the words of
the patentee are held against her. See, e.g., Vehicular, 212 F.3d at 1382 ("Finally, to the extent
that Tractech employees may have testified that they did not believe a back-up spring was
necessary for satisfactory performance, that testimony is contradicted by the clear statements to
the contrary in the '015 patent"). Technically, though, this doctrine is not prosecution history
estoppel because the disclaimer is contained in the specification as filed; the surrender of subject
did not occur by claim amendment or arguments made to the Patent Office.
28. 234 F.3d 558, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc). Prosecution history
estoppel precludes a patentee from obtaining coverage under the doctrine of equivalents of
subject matter he surrendered while prosecuting the patent before the Patent Office. Id. at 564.
29. Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 387; see also Rai, supra note 5, at 1038 n.4 ("Notably, because the Supreme Court, at least
historically, has rarely reviewed Federal Circuit cases, the Federal Circuit's formalist
jurisprudence has typically constituted the final word on patent questions."); see also Thomas G.
Field, The Role of Stare Decisis in the Federal Circuit, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 203, 223 (1999)
(explaining why the Supreme Court does not perform exacting review of the Federal Circuit).
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law to the Federal Circuit by its invisibility. It is true that many of the
patent cases taken by the Supreme Court are "patent cases" only in
the sense that they involve a patent; rarely do they involve substantive
patent law. 30  But Professor Janis speaks too strongly by suggesting
that the Supreme Court has been invisible. To the contrary, although
its decisions have been sparse, the Court has encouraged the Federal
Circuit's shift to formalism and bright-line rules in those substantive
cases it has decided. Thus, its complicity is more than one of
omission-the Supreme Court has actively encouraged the Federal
Circuit's drive towards bright-line rules. A review of the Supreme
Court's recent patent decisions elucidates this subtle prodding.
A. Markman v. Westview Instruments-The Beginning
The Supreme Court reviewed, and affirmed, the aforementioned
Federal Circuit decision in Markman. Although it used slightly
different reasoning, the Court ultimately concluded that claim
construction was a question of law for the judge, not the jury.3 The
reasoning of the Court, however, was more circumspect than the
Federal Circuit's. The Court recognized that claim construction is a
"mongrel practice 3 2 and could contain factual considerations. The
Court nevertheless concluded that a judge is the best actor to interpret
a patent's claims as a functional matter.33 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court emphasized the need for uniformity and certainty in the
construction of patent claims.34 Specifically, the Court reasoned that
Uniformity would, however, be ill served by submitting issues of
document construction to juries .... [W]hereas issue preclusion
could not be asserted against new and independent infringement
defendants even within a given jurisdiction, treating interpretive
30. The Supreme Court has reviewed a number of Federal Circuit patent cases, but those
cases have involved procedural issues, Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460 (2000), the
Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vomado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535
U.S. 826 (2002); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988), state
sovereign immunity, College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666 (1999), the intersection of two areas of intellectual property, J.E.M. AG Supply,
Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (intersection of utility patents and plant
patents), or the allocation of responsibilities in the patent system, Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S.
150 (1999) (requiring Federal Circuit to apply APA standards of review to PTO determinations).
31. Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996).
32. Id. at 378. The use of such language lead to a split in authority at the Federal Circuit
over the appropriate standard of review, which the court resolved in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs.,
138 F.3d 1448, 1454-55 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (holding that claim construction is renewed
de novo on appeal).
33. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388.
34. Id. at 390-91.
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issues as purely legal will promote (though it will not guarantee)
intrajurisdictional certainty through the application of stare decisis
on those questions not yet subject to interjurisdictional uniformity
under the authority of the single appeals court.
35
The Court thus drew upon the same reasoning favored by the
Federal Circuit when it articulates its bright-line rules-the need for
certainty and uniformity. The reasoning of the Court, therefore,
added support for the Federal Circuit's preference for crystal rules.
B. Warner-Jenkinson-Further Encouragement of Formalism
The Supreme Court also reviewed the Federal Circuit's decision
in Hilton Davis.36  While reaffirming the continuing vitality of the
doctrine of equivalents, the Court noted its concern that the doctrine
"has taken on a life of its own that is unbounded by the patent
claims," thereby "conflict[ing] with the definitional and public-notice
functions of the statutory claiming requirement. 3 7  To combat this
problem, the court adopted the All Elements Rule, which requires the
doctrine to be applied on an element-by-element basis. 38 The Court
also articulated a rebuttable presumption with respect to prosecution
history estoppel: if the reason for an amendment is not known, the
35. Id. at 391.
36. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
37. Id at 28-29.
38. Id. at 41. Some commentators view this test as essentially the Court adopting the
standard articulated in Pennwalt. See, e.g., Laura C. Wideman, Note: Wamer-Jenkinson v.
Hilton Davis: Doctrine of Equivalents Clarified?, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 271, 275 (1999)
(discussing Pennwalt by stating that "[flor each element, there must be a corresponding element
in the accused device that performs substantially the same function, the same way, to obtain the
same result"); Chisum, supra note 3, at 30 ("The Supreme Court's 'all elements' approach to
equivalency was adopted earlier by the 1988 Federal Circuit in the en banc Pennwalt
decision..."). The Supreme Court's test, however, is apparently narrower than Pennwalt's.
The Pennwalt test only applies the "way" portion of the tripartite test on a limitation-by-
limitation basis. Wamer-Jenkinson, in contrast, applies all three components of the test to the
relevant claim limitation. See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40 (noting the inquiry of
"whether a substitute element matches the function, way, and result of the claimed element").
Federal Circuit case law after Pennwalt confirmed that the all-elements rule was only relevant to
the "way" portion of the triple identity test: "[a]lthough each claim limitation may not literally
be found in the accused structure, the 'substantially the same way' prong of the Graver Tank test
is met if an equivalent of a recited limitation has been substituted in the accused device."
Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
The court further noted that the remainder of the triple identity test requires inquiry as to
whether the accused device "performs substantially the same overall function to obtain the same
overall result as the claimed invention." Id. at 1258 (emphasis added). As such, the test
articulated in Warner-Jenkinson is narrower than that of the Federal Circuit's approach,
seemingly adding more certainty to this area of the law.
2003]
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court should presume the reason was related to patentability. 39 The
patentee, of course, has the opportunity to rebut this presumption.4°
Again, the Court relies on the Federal Circuit's favorite mantras-
certainty and public notice-to reach its decision in this case, perhaps
further emboldening the Federal Circuit's efforts.
C. Pfaff v. Wells Electronics-The Surprise and Perhaps Most
Telling Case
Perhaps the most surprising case reviewed by the Supreme Court
over the past twenty years is Pfaff v. Wells Electronics.41 The case
did not involve any constitutional issues, such as the right to a jury
trial, and instead dealt strictly with the appropriate standard for the
on-sale bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), which precludes a patent if the
invention was on sale in this country more than one year before an
application for a patent is filed.42 The Court articulated a two-prong
test for the bar: before the critical date,43 the invention must be subject
to a commercial offer to sell and must be ready for patenting, which
can be demonstrated by a reduction to practice 44 of the invention or
by diagrams sufficient to enable a person of skill in the art to make
the invention.45  The Court rejected the Federal Circuit's
"substantially complete" standard in favor of the "ready for patenting
test," recognizing that the Federal Circuit's approach "seriously
undermines the interest in certainty. ' 46 Thus, in this case, the Court
criticized the Federal Circuit for using a vague standard and, in its
place, articulated a more formalistic approach. Pfaff therefore,
39. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33.
40. Id.
41. 525 U.S. 55 (1998); see generally Timothy R. Holbrook, The More Things Change,
the More They Stay the Same: Implications of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. and the Questjbr
Predictability in the On-Sale Bar, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933 (2000) [hereinafter Holbrook,
More Things Change].
42. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
43. The critical date is the date one year before the application date. In re Epstein, 32
F.3d 1559, 1564 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("One year before the filing of the application is referred to
as the 'critical date' for purposes of measuring the 'in public use or on sale' status").
44. "Reduction to practice" is a term of art in patent law that basically means that the
inventor has constructed a physical, functional version of the invention. Hybritech, Inc. v.
Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Actual reduction to
practice requires that the claimed invention work for its intended purpose.") (citation omitted).
45. Pfaff, 55 U.S. at 67-68.
46. Id. at 65-66. The success of this approach in bringing certainty is questionable. See
Holbrook, More Things Change, supra note 41, at 955-66.
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demonstrates that, far from being invisible, the Supreme Court in fact
is encouraging the formalistic tendencies of the Federal Circuit.
47
D. Festo-Turning Point or Outlier?
The Supreme Court also reviewed the Federal Circuit's decision
in Festo and, in a move against formalism, rejected the bright-line,
absolute surrender rule for prosecution history estoppel.48 Instead, the
Court articulated another presumption--courts should presume a
complete surrender of equivalents unless the patentee can demonstrate
that the equivalent was unforeseeable at the time of the amendment,
that the amendment was only tangentially related to the asserted
• 49
equivalent, or that for some other reason estoppel is inappropriate.
Festo potentially represents a shift in the Supreme Court's
encouragement of Federal Circuit formalism. The Court seems to be
communicating that the Federal Circuit had finally gone too far down
the "certainty" side of the fair protection-certainty spectrum.
IV. CONCLUSION
Undisputedly, the Federal Circuit favors the use of bright-line
rules that favor certainty over fairness. Recent Supreme Court cases
demonstrate that it, too, favors such rules-but only up to a point.
Indeed, the Supreme Court's decisions, with the exception of Pfaff
prefer to enhance certainty not by altering substantive rules of patent
law but instead by implementing more procedural rules, such as the
rebuttable presumptions of Warner-Jenkinson and Festo, or offering
guidance to improve reviewability. 50 This procedural approach is
perhaps the more appropriate middle ground, and Festo may represent
the Court's efforts to rein in the Federal Circuit's penchant to
articulate formalistic substantive rules. Whether that effort is
successful remains to be seen. On remand in Festo, the Federal
47. See Thomas, supra note 5, at 780-81.
48. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740 (2002).
49. Id. at 740-41. Some commentators have suggested that this test is significantly
different than the pre-Festo, flexible rule. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 5, at 786. These same
two concepts-foreseeability and tangentialness-were present in pre-Festo Federal Circuit case
law. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1470, 1475, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(noting that accused device involved later-developed technology and that amendments overcame
prior art significantly different than the claimed invention and the accused device, respectively).
50. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8 (suggesting special verdicts, summary
judgment, and rigorous application of legal limitations to improve reviewability and certainty).
2003)
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Circuit appears to have lessened its formalism to some extent.5
While concluding that prosecution history estoppel remains a question
of law for the court, 52 the court did recognize that rebuttal of the Festo
presumption may involve factual issues, for which evidence outside
of the public record may be required. 53 The Federal Circuit has also
abandoned its formalistic approach to the Warner-Jenkinson
presumption. Formerly, if the Warner-Jenkinson presumption
applied, prosecution history estoppel barred all equivalents as to that
limitation.54 Now, pursuant to its most recent decision in Festo:
If, however, the court determines that a narrowing amendment has
been made for a substantial reason relating to patentability-
whether based on a reason reflected in the prosecution history
record or on the patentee's failure to overcome the Warner-
Jenkinson presumption-then the third question in a prosecution
history estoppel analysis addresses the scope of the subject matter
surrendered by the narrowing amendment.
The Federal Circuit thus has retreated, to a certain extent, from
its harsh, formalistic tendencies, at least with respect to prosecution
history estoppel. Time will tell if this represents a sea change in
Federal Circuit thinking or merely a minor step off its formalistic
path. Time will also tell if the Supreme Court will intervene in the
future to ensure that the Federal Circuit does not stray too far down
that path.
51. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
52. Id. at 1367.
53. Id. at 1369 ("Therefore, in determining whether an alleged equivalent would have
been unforeseeable, a district court may hear expert testimony and consider other extrinsic
evidence relating to the relevant factual inquiries").
54. See Sextant Avionique, S.A. v. Analog Devices, Inc., 172 F.3d 817, 832 (Fed. Cir.
1999) ("Finding the Supreme Court's language clear, we hold that in circumstances in which the
Warner-Jenkinson presumption is applicable,.., the prosecution history estoppel arising
therefrom is total and completely 'bars' the application of the doctrine of equivalents as to the
amended limitation").
55. Festo, 344 F.3d at 1367 (emphasis added).
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